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CULTURE CLASH: TEACHING CULTURAL DEFENSES IN THE 
CRIMINAL LAW CLASSROOM 
SUSAN S. KUO* 
“Toto, I’ve a feeling we’re not in Kansas anymore.” 
- Dorothy Gale in the Wizard of Oz1 
For many entering students, law school can resemble L. Frank Baum’s 
land of Oz,2 complete with flying monkeys and wicked witches.  Law school is 
a unique place in and of itself, and, just as there is no place like home, there is 
no place quite like law school.  The distinctive character of law school is 
derived chiefly from the crucible of the law school classroom,3 where first-year 
students begin their ritual journeys through the hallowed halls of legal 
education. 
Many, if not most, students spend a good portion of the first year of their 
legal instruction trying to find a foothold in the unfamiliar territory of the law 
school classroom.  In this classroom, the context for human conflict differs 
starkly from that which students experience in other disciplines as well as 
throughout their primary and secondary educations.4  Whereas in the non-law 
 
* Associate Professor, Northern Illinois University College of Law; Vanderbilt University School 
of Law, J.D. (1994); Duke University, A.B. (1991).  The author would like to thank the Saint 
Louis University Law Journal for the opportunity to participate in this symposium and Cynthia 
M. Ho, Adele M. Morrison, and Jason Richardson for their helpful comments on prior drafts of 
this essay. 
 1. THE WIZARD OF OZ (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1939).  L. Frank Baum does not actually 
give Dorothy’s last name in the original novel of The Wizard of Oz.  Her last name was 
mentioned in the 1902 stage version of the story authored by Baum and in later adaptations of the 
book.  MICHAEL PATRICK HEARN, THE ANNOTATED WIZARD OF OZ 107 n.24 (1973). 
 2. L. Frank Baum wrote over a dozen books about Oz, the land and its people, beginning 
with The Wizard of Oz (originally published as The Wonderful Wizard of Oz) in 1900.  L. FRANK 
BAUM, THE WIZARD OF OZ (Henry Holt and Company, Inc. 1982) (1900). 
 3. The unique culture of the law school classroom has been captured in print and on film.  
See, e.g., LEGALLY BLONDE (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 2001); SCOTT TUROW, ONE L (1978); The 
Paper Chase (CBS television series, 1978); THE PAPER CHASE (Twentieth Century Fox Home 
Entertainment 1973). 
 4. See generally Lorraine Bannai & Anne Enquist, (Un)examined Assumptions and 
(Un)intended Messages: Teaching Students to Recognize Bias in Legal Analysis and Language, 
27 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1 (2003); Melissa Harrison, Searching for Context: A Critique of Legal 
Education by Comparison to Theological Education, 11 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 245 (2002); Susan 
Bryant, The Five Habits: Building Cross-Cultural Competence in Lawyers, 8 CLINICAL L. REV. 
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school environment the complexities of cultural contexts are frequently 
highlighted and earmarked for discussion,5 the Socratic method of legal 
analysis removes the dispute at issue in a given case from its sociocultural 
context6 and takes the cultural backgrounds of the parties into account only 
when they “serve a particular legal argument.”7  Law students learn to identify 
and define people, places, and events by legal categories and to transform 
stories of conflict into legal arguments.  By legally parsing facts, they learn to 
siphon off the emotional and cultural content—both in the stories themselves 
and in their reactions to the stories.8  The language of the law commands that 
they do this because of the enduring belief that the law is neutral and 
impartial.9  This confidence in the objectivity of the law instills our students 
with the notion that “legal analysis can be taught without directly addressing 
conflicts of individual values, experiences, and world views.”10  Accordingly, 
cultural conflicts are deemed irrelevant to legal analysis because laws are 
unbiased and “culture-blind.”  This detached outlook has been termed 
 
33 (2001); Susan F. Hirsch, Making Culture Visible: Comments on Elizabeth Mertz’s Teaching 
Lawyers the Language of Law: Legal and Anthropological Translations, 34 J. MARSHALL L. 
REV. 119 (2000); Elizabeth Mertz, Teaching Lawyers the Language of Law: Legal and 
Anthropological Translations, 34 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 91 (2000). 
 5. For example, Professor Hirsch encourages her anthropology students to “think clearly 
about their own positioning in relation to any cultural context they study or encounter in their 
personal lives.”  Hirsch, supra note 4, at 123.  By inviting her students to consider their own 
cultural circumstances vis-à-vis the cultural circumstances of other individuals and societies, she 
makes culture “visible” in her class.  Id. at 123-26. 
 6. This also happens in classrooms that rely on non-maieutic teaching methods.  Mertz, 
supra note 4, at 99 (noting that “even classrooms that did not employ the Socratic method 
imparted the same decontextualized orientation to students”). 
 7. Hirsch, supra note 4, at 122. 
 8. Professor Mertz’s study of Contracts classes in eight different law schools revealed the 
distinctive orientation toward social conflict that is taught in the traditional law school classroom.  
Mertz, supra note 4, at 98-106. 
 9. Many challenge this claimed objectivity.  See, e.g., Kim Brooks & Debra Parkes, Law 
and Sexuality: Moving from the Back to the Front of the Classroom, 1 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 
637, 642-43 (2003) (noting that “[w]ork by critical race scholars rejects the positing of an 
analytical stance that has no specific cultural, political, or class characteristics, and that lays claim 
to neutrality”); Margo Schlanger, Teaching Torts: Gender Matters: Teaching a Reasonable 
Woman Standard in Personal Injury Law, 45 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 769, 778 (suggesting that teaching 
a reasonable woman standard in Torts may help “counter the alienation some law students 
report . . . caused by law school classes’ facade of ‘perspectivelessness’”); Mertz, supra note 4, at 
109 (stating that “[i]n converting virtually every possible event or conflict into a shared rhetoric, 
legal language generates an appearance of neutrality that belies its often deeply skewed 
institutional workings”); Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, Foreword: Toward a Race-Conscious 
Pedagogy in Legal Education, 4 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 33, 46-49 (1994) (discussing 
the lack of racial perspective in anti-discrimination law). 
 10. Crenshaw, supra note 9, at 35. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2004] CULTURE CLASH 1299 
“perspectivelessness”11 to denote a neutral, odorless, colorless non-perspective.  
In truth, however, this presumed objective or neutral viewpoint “is often the 
embodiment of a white middle-class world view.”12 
To provide some perspective on this apparent perspectivelessness, I 
incorporate the issue of the cultural defense in my Criminal Law course.  
Discussing the use of or the potential for using cultural defenses creates space 
within the classroom discussion for considering perspectives other than those 
inherent in traditional legal analysis.  This not only affirms the relevance of 
other worldviews, but also calls into question the illusion of objectivity that 
cloaks our laws.  My hope is that, by addressing this matter, my students will 
learn to recognize the cultural assumptions imbedded in the cases they are 
reading and gain a deeper understanding of the law.13 
There are practical, nuts-and-bolts reasons for addressing cultural defenses 
in Criminal Law.  In particular, litigants often raise cultural issues in both civil 
and criminal cases.14  Plus, the extraordinary numbers of individuals from 
other countries who are currently prosecuted and incarcerated in the United 
States could give rise to more opportunities for courts to consider cultural 
arguments.15  In addition, the influx of immigrants into the United States in 
recent years will likely add to the cultural diversity already existing in our 
society.16  The majority of immigrants living in the United States come from 
 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. See Bannai & Enquist, supra note 4, at 6-7 (asserting that students must become 
“culturally competent” by learning “to recognize when and how their life experiences and 
personal views are being expressed in their analysis of legal problems so that their arguments are 
the result of conscious, knowing decisions”); Kellye Y. Testy, Adding Value(s) to Corporate 
Law: An Agenda for Reform, 34 GA. L. REV. 1025, 1030-31 (2000) (stating that “[c]onsideration 
of these issues [of race, gender, and class] provides a richer view of law and the society it serves, 
providing a more nuanced, sophisticated treatment of theory, doctrine, and policy”); Okianer 
Christian Dark, Incorporating Issues of Race, Gender, Class, Sexual Orientation, and Disability 
into Law School Teaching, 32 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 541, 544-45 (1996) (arguing that discussion 
of diversity issues helps to develop a student’s intellectual depth and breadth); Charles R. 
Calleros, Training a Diverse Student Body for a Multicultural Society, 8 LA RAZA L.J. 140, 141-
42 (1995) (emphasizing that requiring students to consider diversity issues helps to develop 
critical thinking skills). 
 14. For a thorough discussion of the large variety of cases in which cultural arguments have 
been made, see ALISON DUNDES RENTELN, THE CULTURAL DEFENSE (2004). 
 15. As of February 2004, more than 20% of the Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) 
population were non-U.S. citizens.  BOP figures list 16.5% of the federal prisoners as citizens of 
Mexico, 2.1% from Colombia, 1.4% from Cuba, 2% from the Dominican Republic, and 6.8% 
from other countries or unknown.  FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS, QUICK FACTS, 
http://www.bop.gov/fact0598.html (Feb. 2004). 
 16. Recent census reports show that 11.5% (approximately 32 million of the more than 280 
million people) of the non-institutionalized U.S. population is foreign-born.  U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU, THE FOREIGN-BORN POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES: MARCH 2002, 
http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/p20-539.pdf (Feb.  2003) [hereinafter CENSUS MARCH 
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non-Western-based traditions and legal principles,17 and nearly half of these 
foreign-born individuals have entered the United States since 1990.18 
The people of this nation come from many different countries and many 
different cultural backgrounds.19  Considering that an individual’s culture has 
an undeniable influence on his or her perceptions or behavior20 and thus may 
impact an individual’s motivations, litigants and their attorneys are likely to 
continue petitioning the courts to recognize cultural defenses.  For this reason, 
including some coverage of cultural defenses in the first-year Criminal Law 
course will alert students to the possibility that these cultural issues will arise.21 
 
2002].  Between 1990 and 2000, the number of foreign-born people living in the United States 
increased by more than half.  U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE FOREIGN-BORN POPULATION: 2000, 
http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/c2kbr-34.pdf  (Dec. 2003). 
 17. Of these foreign-born individuals, 52.2% are from Latin America and 25.5% are from 
Asia.  CENSUS MARCH 2002, supra note 16, at 1. 
 18. Id. at 3.  Another 24.5% came during the 1980s, 14.2% entered during the 1970s, and the 
remainder of the foreign-born population immigrated prior to 1970.  Id. 
 19. My reference to culture here is to the “customary beliefs, social forms, and material traits 
of a racial, religious, or social group.”  Merriam-Webster OnLine, at http://m-w.com/cgi-
bin/dictionary?book=dictionary&va=culture (last visited Mar. 16, 2004).  The Canadian 
UNESCO Commission set forth a similar definition of culture: “Culture is a dynamic value 
system of learned elements, with assumptions, conventions, beliefs and rules permitting members 
of a group to relate to each other and to the world, to communicate and to develop their creative 
potential.”  Canadian Commission for UNESCO, “A Working Definition of ‘Culture,’” 83. 
 20. RALPH LINTON, THE TREE OF CULTURE 39 (1961).  As explained by Linton: 
No matter what the method by which the individual receives the elements of culture 
characteristic of his society, he is sure to internalize most of them.  This process is called 
enculturation.  Even the most deliberately unconventional person is unable to escape his 
culture to any significant degree. . . . Cultural influences are so deep that even the 
behavior of the insane reflects them strongly. 
Id. (emphasis in original).  Numerous psychology scholars have also addressed the manner in 
which culture affects cognition and behavior.  See, e.g., Shinobu Kitayama et al., The Collective 
Construction of Self Esteem: Implications for Culture, Self, and Emotion, in EVERYDAY 
CONCEPTIONS OF EMOTION 523 (James A. Russell et al. eds., 1995); Alan Page Fiske et al., The 
Cultural Matrix of Social Psychology, in 2 THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 915 
(Daniel T. Gilbert et al. eds., 4th ed. 1991); Richard A. Shweder & Edmund J. Bourne, Does the 
Concept of the Person Vary Cross-Culturally?, in CULTURAL CONCEPTIONS OF MENTAL 
HEALTH AND THERAPY 97, 110-25 (Anthony J. Marsella & Geoffrey M. White eds., 1982). 
 21. I do not mean to imply that culture is a static concept and that immigrants do not adopt 
new values and traditions.  Although acculturation and assimilation do occur, the extent to which 
they take place varies, depending on multiple factors, such as generation.  Moreover, the general 
understanding among academics is that individuals are more likely to become bicultural or 
multicultural, as opposed to becoming entirely assimilated.  See, e.g., José Szapocznik & William 
Kurtines, Acculturation, Biculturalism and Adjustment Among Cuban Americans, in 
ACCULTURATION: THEORY, MODELS AND SOME NEW FINDINGS 139 (Amado M. Padilla ed., 
1980). 
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My teaching plan for this lesson contains three distinct points or issues:22 
(1) the relevance of culture to the criminal law, (2) the propriety of cultural 
defenses in the criminal law, and (3) the culture of the law school classroom.  
To accommodate different learning styles, 23 I state these issues as well as list 
them on the blackboard.24  For the kinesthetic learners,25 I graphically describe 
the issues as lying one within the other like three concentric circles or spheres, 
with Issue One representing the smallest circle and the common center for all 
three issues.  I also draw a figure that looks like a target on the blackboard and 
label the center circle as “Issue 1,” the middle circle as “Issue 2,” and the 
outside circle as “Issue 3.”26  Issue One fits within the greater context of Issue 
Two, which, in turn, is situated within the greatest context of Issue Three.27  I 
then commence the substantive lesson by beginning with the smallest point, 
Issue One—whether culture is relevant.  We discuss several cases or fact 
patterns and consider how a cultural defense might be used in each situation.  
Next, we move to Issue Two and the students make arguments for or against 
the use of cultural defenses in our criminal legal system.  This dialogue 
includes general reflection about our legal system and specific consideration of 
whether cultural assumptions are inherent in our criminal laws.  Finally, I put 
Issues One and Two within the context of Issue Three.  At this point, we mull 
over the process of legal education and the distinct culture of the law school 
classroom.  The following discussion provides a rough idea of my line of 
attack.  Hopefully, it will help generate ideas for others interested in teaching 
cultural defenses in Criminal Law. 
 
 22. My pedagogical approach in Criminal Law varies, depending on the particular subject 
matter to be discussed.  Notwithstanding the stylistic differences in my teaching, however, I 
typically try to distill each lesson down to one or two central points or issues and then devote my 
lecture to supporting and developing these points.  An adventurous class session may include an 
extra point or two.  Based on this approach, I suppose that the cultural defense class session is a 
bit ambitious (relative to my more modest and usual maximum of two points per day). 
 23. See generally F. NOAH GORDON, MAGICAL CLASSROOM: CREATING EFFECTIVE, BRAIN-
FRIENDLY ENVIRONMENTS FOR LEARNING (1995); HOWARD GARDNER, MULTIPLE 
INTELLIGENCES: THE THEORY IN PRACTICE (1993); FRANK EDWIN WILLIAMS, A TOTAL 
CREATIVITY PROGRAM FOR INDIVIDUALIZING AND HUMANIZING THE LEARNING PROCESS 
(1972). 
 24. Writing on the board aids visual learners who prefer images, pictures, colors, and maps.  
Learning-Styles-Online.com, The Visual (Spatial) Learning Style, at http://www.learning-styles-
online.com/style/visual-spatial/ (last visited Mar. 16, 2004). 
 25. Some hand gestures to roughly illustrate the layering of the concentric spheres are often 
helpful for kinesthetic learners.  These individuals learn best through physical movement or 
physical sensation.  Describing the physical feelings of an action or using metaphors to depict a 
concept or theory is also helpful for these learners.  Learning-Styles-Online.com, The Physical 
(Bodily-Kinesthetic) Learning Style, at http://www.learning-styles-online.com/style/physical-
bodily-kinesthetic/ (last visited Mar. 16, 2004). 
 26. This illustration aids visual learners in their understanding as well. 
 27. Arguably, Issue Three fits within an even greater context—that of the U.S. legal system. 
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A. Issue One: Whether Culture Is Relevant 
Individuals have invoked a cultural defense in numerous cases.28  
Consequently, interesting fact patterns abound for those wishing to incorporate 
cultural defenses in Criminal Law classes.  I begin by using Socratic 
questioning to get the students to discuss and think about the holdings and 
analyses in the appellate cases that I have assigned.  In one case, State v. 
Williams,29 a cultural defense was not raised but arguably could have been; in 
the other, State v. Aphaylath,30 cultural factors were vital to the defense 
strategy.  We consider the potential for cultural issues to have influenced the 
result in Williams.  With respect to Aphaylath, we discuss the use of culture by 
the defense and the court’s consideration of the cultural argument.  I then 
submit fact patterns from other cases and question students about the relevancy 
of culture in those cases.31 
 
 28. Alison Dundes Renteln compiles hundreds of these cases, both civil and criminal.  
RENTELN, supra note 14. 
 29. 484 P.2d 1167 (Wash. Ct. App. 1971). 
 30. 502 N.E.2d 998 (N.Y. 1986). 
 31. Many authors have addressed the use of culture as a potential defense, both in theory and 
in practice.  See, e.g., Kay L. Levine, Negotiating the Boundaries of Crime and Culture: A 
Sociolegal Perspective on Cultural Defense Strategies, 28 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 39 (2003); 
Michele Wen Chen Wu, Comment, Culture Is No Defense for Infanticide, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER 
SOC. POL’Y & L. 975 (2003); Nancy A. Wanderer & Catherine R. Connors, Culture and Crime: 
Kargar and the Existing Framework for a Cultural Defense, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 829 (1999); 
Thomas D. Barton, Troublesome Connections: The Law and Post-Enlightenment Culture, 47 
EMORY L.J. 163 (1998); Doriane Lambelet Coleman, The Seattle Compromise: Multicultural 
Sensitivity and Americanization, 47 DUKE L.J. 717 (1998); Michael Fischer, Note, The Human 
Rights Implications of a “Cultural Defense,” 6 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 663 (1998); Farah 
Sultana Brelvi, “News of the Weird”: Specious Normativity and the Problem of the Cultural 
Defense, 28 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 657 (1997); Todd Taylor, Note, The Cultural Defense 
and its Irrelevancy in Child Protection Law, 17 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 331 (1997); Cathy C. 
Cardillo, Note, Violence Against Chinese Women: Defining the Cultural Role, 19 WOMEN’S RTS. 
L. REP. 85 (1997); Dan M. Kahan, Ignorance of Law is an Excuse—But Only for the Virtuous, 96 
MICH. L. REV. 127 (1997); Nancy S. Kim, The Cultural Defense and the Problem of Cultural 
Preemption: A Framework for Analysis, 27 N.M. L. REV. 101 (1997); Stanislaw Pomorski, On 
Multiculturalism, Concepts of Crime, and the “De Minimis” Defense, 1997 BYU L. REV. 51; 
Cassandra Terhune, Comment, Cultural and Religious Defenses to Child Abuse and Neglect, 14 
J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 152 (1997); Tracy E. Higgins, Anti- Essentialism, Relativism, and 
Human Rights, 19 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 89 (1996); Sharon M. Tomao, Note, The Cultural 
Defense: Traditional or Formal?, 10 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 241 (1996); Leti Volpp, Talking 
“Culture”: Gender, Race, Nation, and the Politics of Multiculturalism, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1573 
(1996) [hereinafter Volpp, Talking “Culture”]; Susan Girardo Roy, Note, Restoring Hope or 
Tolerating Abuse?  Responses to Domestic Violence Against Immigrant Women, 9 GEO. IMMIGR. 
L.J. 263 (1995); Daina C. Chiu, Comment, The Cultural Defense: Beyond Exclusion, 
Assimilation, and Guilty Liberalism, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1053 (1994); Alice J. Gallin, Note, The 
Cultural Defense: Undermining the Policies Against Domestic Violence, 35 B.C. L. REV. 723 
(1994); Taryn F. Goldstein, Comment, Cultural Conflicts in Court: Should the American 
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In State v. Williams, the defendants, husband and wife, were charged with 
the crime of manslaughter for negligently failing to obtain necessary medical 
treatment for their seventeen-month-old child.32  The child had been ill for 
twelve days, but the defendants did not realize how sick he was.33  From prior 
experience, they knew that medical help was available, yet did not take the 
baby to a doctor for fear that the government would take the child away from 
them.34  Thinking that he suffered only from a toothache, they gave him 
aspirin.35  The baby’s ailment, however, was an abscessed tooth, which became 
gangrenous and eventually led to his death.36  Despite finding that the parents 
loved the baby but “were ignorant,”37 the trial court found the defendants 
guilty of manslaughter.38  On appeal, the Washington Court of Appeals upheld 
the lower court’s judgment.39  Although the defendants were unaware of the 
severity of the child’s condition, the evidence adduced at trial showed that the 
baby was fussy and could not eat.40  His cheek had become swollen and 
“turned ‘a bluish color like.’”41 Following discussion of the parental duty to 
provide medical care for a minor child and the level of culpability required for 
statutory manslaughter, the court determined that the baby’s symptoms and 
lack of improvement during the period that medical care could have saved him 
put the defendants on notice that medical attention was required.42 
Although not addressed in the Williams opinion, a potential cultural 
defense lurks in the court’s recitation of the facts.  The court described the 
husband as “a 24-year-old full-blooded Sheshont Indian with a sixth-grade 
 
Criminal Justice System Formally Recognize a “Cultural Defense”?, 99 DICK. L. REV. 141 
(1994); Leti Volpp, (Mis)identifying Culture: Asian Women and the “Cultural Defense,” 17 
HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 57 (1994) [hereinafter Volpp, (Mis)identifying Culture]; Donna L. Kotake, 
Survey: Women and California Law, 23 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 1069 (1993); Nilda Rimonte, 
A Question of Culture: Cultural Approval of Violence Against Women in the Pacific-Asian 
Community and the Cultural Defense, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1311 (1991); Melissa Spatz, A “Lesser” 
Crime: A Comparative Study of Legal Defenses for Men Who Kill their Wives, 24 COLUM. J.L. & 
SOC. PROBS. 597 (1991); Carolyn Choi, Comment, Application of a Cultural Defense in Criminal 
Proceedings, 8 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 80 (1990); Malek-Mithra Sheybani, Comment, Cultural 
Defense: One Person’s Culture is Another’s Crime, 9 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 751 (1987); 
Note, The Cultural Defense in the Criminal Law, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1293 (1986). 
 32. State v. Williams, 484 P.2d 1167, 1169 (Wash. Ct. App. 1971). 
 33. Id. at 1170. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 1173. 
 37. Williams, 484 P.2d at 1170. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 1174. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Williams, 484 P.2d at 1174. 
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education”43 and the wife as “a 20-year-old part Indian with an 11th grade 
education.”44  Although the defendants’ respective levels of education appear 
to have been implicated in the court’s discussion,45 their cultural backgrounds 
do not appear to have played any role in the ultimate determination.  
Notwithstanding this, the defendants’ cultural identities provided strong 
support for their fear of bringing the baby to the doctor.  The Williamses had 
good reason to be frightened.  During the early 1970s, state authorities had 
removed approximately twenty-five to thirty-five percent of Indian children 
from their homes.46  These children were usually placed in non-Indian foster 
care or non-Indian adoptive families.47  A leading factor motivating this 
practice was the common belief among social workers that an Indian 
reservation was not a proper place for a child to be reared.48  That the 
defendants were aware of the risk that they might lose their child is clear—they 
testified that they had heard that the husband’s cousin had lost a child in this 
manner and that they were afraid the same thing would happen to them.49  
While this factor does not necessarily call for a different judgment, a defense 
based on these cultural considerations might well have been relevant to the 
determination of the Williamses’ culpability.  At the very least, cultural 
concerns might have been taken into account in the decision to prosecute the 
defendants. 
In People v. Aphaylath, the defense raised cultural issues for the purpose of 
mitigating a charge of intentional homicide.50  The defendant, a Laotian 
refugee, stabbed his wife to death in a jealous rage because she had 
“display[ed] affection for another man and receiv[ed] phone calls from an 
 
 43. Id. at 1169. 
 44. Id. at 1169-70. 
 45. The court accepted the trial court’s finding that the defendants were ignorant.  Id. at 
1170. 
 46. William Byler, Removing Children: The Destruction of American Indian Families, C.R. 
DIG., Summer 1977, at 19.  These statistics were taken from surveys of states with large Indian 
populations.  The Association on American Indian Affairs conducted the surveys in 1969 and 
again in 1974.  During this time, the Indian adoption rate was nineteen times greater and the 
foster care rate ten times greater than for non-Indian children.  Id. 
 47. See id. at 20 (noting that approximately “85 percent of all Indian children in foster care 
were living in non-Indian homes”). 
 48. Id. at 22. 
 49. Williams, 484 P.2d at 1174. 
 50. 502 N.E.2d 998, 999 (N.Y. 1986).  People v. Poddar is another case with similar facts.  
518 P.2d 342 (Cal. 1974).  Poddar was a member of the Harijan (untouchable) caste who was 
attending graduate school in the United States.  Id. at 344.  After a young woman with whom he 
believed he had a romantic relationship rejected him, he killed her.  Id. at 345.  At trial, he sought 
to introduce testimony about the cultural stresses he had experienced while adjusting from life as 
an untouchable to life as a student in the United States.  Id.  See also Alison Dundes Renteln, A 
Justification of the Cultural Defense as Partial Excuse, 2 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 
437, 469-71 (1993) (describing Poddar’s cultural claims). 
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unattached man.”51  Defense counsel argued that, under a Laotian worldview, 
the victim’s conduct “brought shame on [the] defendant and his family 
sufficient to trigger [the] defendant’s loss of control.”52  In support of this 
claim, the defense sought to introduce expert testimony about Laotian culture 
and the “stress and disorientation encountered by Laotian refugees in 
attempting to assimilate into the American culture.”53  The trial judge 
disallowed the testimony because the experts had not evaluated the defendant 
and could only provide general information about Laotian culture and the 
adjustment problems experienced by refugees.54  The defendant was convicted 
of murder in the second degree.55  On appeal, the New York Court of Appeals 
found that “the admissibility of expert testimony . . . does not depend on 
whether the witness has personal knowledge of a defendant or a defendant’s 
particular characteristics.”56  The court concluded, instead, that the relevancy 
of expert testimony is a determination to be made by the trial judge.57  
Accordingly, the court reversed the lower court’s decision and remanded the 
case for a new trial, directing the lower court to weigh the probative value of 
the testimony about cultural issues with respect to the facts of the case.58 
Other cases provide interesting facts for consideration of a cultural defense 
as well.  For example, in the case of People v. Kimura,59 a Japanese-American 
woman, after learning of her husband’s infidelity, attempted to commit oyako-
shinju (parent-child suicide) by wading into the Pacific Ocean with her two 
young children.  Although illegal in Japan, a parent survivor of oyako-shinju is 
rarely punished.60  The act is based on the view that it is crueler to leave a child 
behind without a caretaker than it is to take the child with the parent into the 
 
 51. Aphaylath, 502 N.E.2d at 999. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 998. 
 56. Aphaylath, 502 N.E.2d at 999-1000. 
 57. Id. at 1000. 
 58. Id. 
 59. No. A-091133 (L.A. Super. Ct. 1985).  People v. Wu has a similar theme.  286 Cal. Rptr. 
868 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991), rev’g No. ICR 12873 (Super. Ct. Riverside Co. 1990).  Helen Wu, a 
Chinese woman living in the United States strangled her son and then tried to commit suicide by 
slashing her wrists.  Id. at 872.  Her actions were motivated by her lover’s rejections and poor 
treatment of their son.  Id.  The defense argued that she acted to save her son and herself from 
shame and abuse and to be reunited with her son in the afterlife.  Id. at 879, 886.  See also Volpp, 
(Mis)identifying Culture, supra note 31, at 84-91 (describing Wu’s presentation of cultural 
information). 
 60. Maura Dolan, Two Cultures Collide over Act of Despair: Mother Facing Charges in 
Ceremonial Drowning, LOS ANGELES TIMES, Feb. 24, 1985, at 3.  In the mid-1980s, 
approximately 500 cases of parent-child suicide or attempted parent-child suicide were reported 
annually in Japan.  Gordon Dillow, When Legal System and Culture Collide, LOS ANGELES 
HERALD EXAMINER, Feb. 18, 1985, at A1. 
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afterlife.61  The woman, Fumiko Kimura, survived, but the two children died.62  
She was charged with first-degree murder for their deaths.63  Could she have 
raised a cultural defense and claimed ignorance or mistake of law? 
In People v. (Kong) Moua,64 the defendant, a Hmong-American man, 
carried off a young Hmong-American woman as part of a traditional Hmong 
zij poj niam or “marriage by capture” ritual.  The custom of zij poj niam 
requires that the man and woman engage in sexual intercourse to consummate 
the marriage.  Pursuant to tradition, the woman indicates her willingness to 
marry the man by protesting the sexual interaction.65  Her protests are evidence 
of her purity.  Correspondingly, the man is required to physically overcome her 
objections to prove his masculinity and readiness to become her husband.66  In 
Moua, the defendant believed that the victim had consented to marry him and 
engaged in sexual intercourse with her.  The victim’s resistance, however, was 
genuine, and she filed kidnapping and rape charges against the defendant. 67  
Could Moua have claimed a mistake of fact as to her consent based on his 
misinterpretation of her protests pursuant to the Hmong marriage ritual? 
Two other cases spark lively discussion.  In People v. Romero,68 the 
defendant, who had killed another man in a street fight, sought to raise a self-
defense argument based in part on the role of street fighters in defending 
family honor pursuant to Hispanic culture.69  In State v. Kargar,70 an Afghani 
refugee, who was convicted of gross sexual assault for kissing his eighteen-
month-old son’s penis, explained that “kissing a son’s penis is common in 
Afghanistan, that it is done to show love for the child, and that it is the same 
whether the penis is kissed or entirely put into the mouth because there are no 
 
 61. Dolan, supra note 60, at 3. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Dillow, supra note 60.  Kimura claimed temporary insanity based on her inability to 
distinguish between her own life and the lives of her children.  As a result of plea-bargaining, the 
murder charge was reduced to voluntary manslaughter.  Many commentators cite cultural factors 
for the reduction in charge.  RENTELN, supra note 14, at 25. 
 64. No. 315972 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1985). 
 65. Fischer, supra note 31, at 686. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Moua, No. 315972 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1985).  In the end, Moua pleaded guilty to false 
imprisonment charges, and the kidnapping and rape charges were dropped. 
 68. 69 Cal. App. 4th 846 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999). 
 69. Id. at 852.  In the illustrious case of People v. Croy, the defendant also presented a 
cultural defense in the context of a claim of self-defense.  710 P.2d 392 (Cal. 1985).  The 
defendant, a Native American, killed a police officer during a police chase and argued that his 
conduct was a result of his life-long conditioning to distrust and fear white authorities.  See 
Renteln, supra note 50, at 454-56 (describing Croy’s presentation of a cultural defense in the 
context of self-defense); David Talbot, The Ballad of Hooty Croy, L.A. TIMES, June 24, 1990 
(Magazine), at 16 (summarizing the prosecution’s and the defense’s versions of the facts). 
 70. 679 A.2d 81 (Me. 1996). 
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sexual feelings involved.”71  In Romero, the court rejected the cultural 
argument,72 but in Kargar, the cultural claims led to a dismissal of the 
prosecution under a de minimis statute.73 
Cases such as these help students understand some of the ways in which 
culture may be relevant in a criminal case.  Cultural arguments may be 
important in determining the level, if any, of a defendant’s liability, in 
mitigating a severe sentence, or in the reduction of a charge.  Cultural issues 
might be pertinent to a claim of mistake of law or fact or to an argument of 
self-defense or defense of others. 
B. Issue Two: Whether To Allow Cultural Defenses 
After establishing a small range of cases in which individuals have or 
could have invoked a cultural defense, I turn class discussion toward 
developing the implications of allowing cultural defenses.74  More often than 
not, students are eager to make the general arguments for or against the use of 
these defenses.  Some students approve of the use of cultural defenses if the 
conduct at issue would be legal or excusable under the laws of the defendant’s 
native country.  I elicit from these students the point that the United States is a 
culturally diverse nation and that allowing evidence of a defendant’s culture 
demonstrates respect for multiculturalism. 
Other students counter that equality and fairness mandate that a single 
standard of justice apply to all persons, regardless of culture or ethnicity.  
These students argue that allowing cultural defenses would ultimately result in 
anarchy, because different legal standards would apply to different individuals 
for similar acts.  Moreover, determining who could raise a cultural defense 
would be fraught with complexity.  For example, would these defenses be 
limited to immigrants?  If so, must these individuals have recently arrived in 
the United States?  Would a culturally isolated individual who had spent a 
significant amount of time in the United States be able to raise a cultural 
defense?  Related to this point is the contention that cultural defenses 
perpetuate racism by reinforcing negative stereotypes.  What is more, these 
students argue that the majority of Americans lack distinct ethnic or cultural 
identities and thus would be unable to use a cultural defense.  These 
 
 71. Id. at 83. 
 72. Romero, 69 Cal. App. 4th at 854-55. 
 73. Kargar, 679 A.2d at 85-86.  Generally speaking, de minimis statutes provide courts with 
flexibility in administering criminal statutes in unusual cases to avoid injustice.  For an extended 
discussion of Kargar, see Wanderer & Connors, supra note 31, at 836-50. 
 74. Students will invariably attempt to challenge the use of cultural defenses during the 
initial discussion of Issue One.  I usually request that they hold their comments until we move on 
to Issue Two, so that we can first fully discuss the various occasions on which a cultural defense 
may potentially be raised. 
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individuals would be held to a higher standard than those able to raise cultural 
defenses. 
Opponents of the use of cultural defenses also argue that allowing such 
defenses would undermine the deterrent and protective goals of the criminal 
justice system.  Immigrants would be less inclined to comply with the law if 
their cultural views excused their criminal behavior.  The protective goal of the 
criminal laws would be impaired because the allowance of cultural defenses 
devalues the lives or safety of the victims by bestowing preferential treatment 
on the defendants.75  Finally, students reason that rejecting cultural defenses 
will speed up the process of assimilation by promoting awareness of and 
conformity to the United States laws. 
The idea of this debate is not only to assay the pros and cons of allowing 
cultural defenses, but also to discuss cultural defenses within the larger context 
and culture of our criminal laws.  Underlying the arguments on both sides of 
the discussion is the unstated assumption that the criminal laws of the United 
States are devoid of culture—a notion that fails to recognize that “law itself is 
an expression of social values.”76  Even those in favor of allowing cultural 
defenses appear to assume that our laws are objectively neutral, but that 
permitting arguments based on culture promotes tolerance for difference.  
“This failure to acknowledge the multiplicity of American identity leaves 
American identity, and specifically the identity of United States law, a neutral 
and unquestioned backdrop.”77  In reality, however, our legal standards 
embody the values of the dominant perspective in our society. 
Developing this point calls for deeper reflection on the part of the class 
about the inherent subjectivity of our legal standards.  The formal neutrality of 
the law conceals its innate bias.  As a result, “while dominant perspectives are 
granted the protection of apparent objectivity, minority perspectives are 
identified as such and viewed as subjective and biased.”78  Seeing beyond the 
apparent neutrality of our laws helps make room for minority perspectives.  
Although individuals may disagree about the propriety of allowing a cultural 
defense in any given case, acknowledging the validity of contrasting views 
reveals the subjectivity of legal doctrine in its construction and application. 
This exercise in “cultural competency” encourages students to be mindful 
of the cultural assumptions contained in the cases that they read.79  
Furthermore, in investigating the manifestation of bias in legal doctrine, 
students learn to recognize their own biases.  Being cognizant of their own 
 
 75. Some students argue that allowing the use of cultural defenses justifies and even 
condones violence against women and children. 
 76. Bannai & Enquist, supra note 4, at 5. 
 77. Volpp, (Mis)identifying Culture, supra note 31, at 61. 
 78. Crenshaw, supra note 9, at 46. 
 79. Bannai & Enquist, supra note 4, at 4. 
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preconceptions may make them more receptive to different perceptions about 
what is fair or persuasive.80  At the very least, it helps to ensure that their 
arguments are the result of conscious decision-making.81 
Discussion of Issue Two is highly participatory but not lacking in 
structure.  Depending on the specific context in which a cultural defense is 
raised, the persuasiveness of the arguments for or against allowing its use may 
vary in potency.  Although I do not assign theoretical analyses of the use of 
culture in criminal law, my own understanding stems from the work of others.  
For some scholars, a formalized cultural defense or an absolute rejection of the 
defense fails to consider the “fluid and shifting nature of American identity.”82  
Another point, made by Leti Volpp, is that individual members of a particular 
community experience culture in different ways.83  Considering the continuum 
of individual experiences, expert testimony proffered to explain a particular 
individual’s state of mind may present the best option for resolving the 
difficult problem of allowing cultural defenses.  Thus, the propriety of raising a 
cultural defense would be determined on “a case-by-case basis examination of 
cultural representation.”84 
C. Issue Three: The Culture of the Law School Classroom 
The third and all-encompassing point85 that bears mentioning concerns the 
process of legal education and its attendant “blind eye” to cultural difference.86  
Legal education focuses attention on legal authority and the facts or 
circumstances of a case that fit within the relevant legal context.  To link a new 
set of facts with legal precedent, students must filter out facts that do not lie 
 
 80. See Cynthia Kwei Yung Lee, Race and Self-Defense: Toward a Normative Conception 
of Reasonableness, 81 MINN. L. REV. 367, 368-69 (1996) (“Most of us are prejudiced—some of 
us more or less so than others.  The extent to which we act upon our prejudices, however, may 
depend in part upon our awareness and understanding of the stereotypes that inform our daily 
lives.”). 
 81. See Jody Armour, Stereotypes and Prejudice: Helping Legal Decisionmakers Break the 
Prejudice Habit, 83 CAL. L. REV. 733, 736-37 (1995) (arguing that making stereotyped views 
explicit enhances the decision-making process). 
 82. Volpp, (Mis)identifying Culture, supra note 31, at 61. 
 83. Id. at 76-77, 84, 93-94 (examining how discussions of culture and cultural defenses can 
erase competing perceptions of culture). 
 84. Volpp, Talking “Culture,” supra note 31, at 1596. 
 85. By “all-encompassing,” I mean that this third issue subsumes the first and second issues; 
the limited use of the cultural defense in the context of the criminal law is a sub-part of the larger 
issues surrounding the limited use of culture in the context of legal education. 
 86. For opening my eyes to this point, I thank Professors Kimberly Crenshaw, Susan Hirsch, 
and Elizabeth Mertz.  See generally Crenshaw, supra note 9; Hirsch, supra note 4; Mertz, supra 
note 4. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
1310 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 48:1297 
within this legal framework and hone in on the legally controlling aspects of 
the case.87 
After several weeks of legal indoctrination, students become increasingly 
proficient at the process of sorting legally relevant facts.  Their efforts often 
lead them to disregard factors, including cultural factors, that they might have 
previously considered as compelling to empathy or emotion.  To draw this 
point out, I sometimes inquire as to whether the cultural background of the 
parties was something the students had included in their case briefs.  Very 
often, this factor is overlooked and the persons involved in the case are 
reduced to “defendants,” “victims,” and “the government.”  Their briefs omit 
any characteristics irrelevant to the legal arguments at stake.  When asked why 
cultural traits were omitted, students almost invariably respond that such 
qualities were unrelated to the legal analysis of the case.88  In their freshly 
trained legal minds, cultural factors have no place in the discussion.  Further 
questioning reveals that many students initially considered these factors when 
reading the case but quickly discarded them in their haste to locate details 
important to the court’s discussion or to their own analyses.89  Some will go so 
far as to admit they did not believe the court was fair in refusing to consider 
cultural factors, but that the law did not take such aspects into consideration.  
This discourse ultimately leads to a brief critique of legal education and its 
impact on the way students read, analyze, and understand the significance of 
cases.90  Together we begin to appreciate how this legal process of sifting 
through the details of a case can obscure certain facts of human conflict that 
may be important to achieving justice in a given case. 
In this essay as well as in the classroom, I do not quibble with the process 
that takes place in our legal education.91  Rather, I merely observe that the 
process exists and make note of how it functions.  Even devoid of polemic or 
praise, this issue is not one that can be fully addressed during the fifty-minute 
segment I allot to covering cultural defenses.  Nor is it one that can be easily or 
gently teased out of the class.92  Nevertheless, I make an effort to sally forth if 
 
 87. Mertz, supra note 4, at 98-110. 
 88. For example, students will argue that the language of state homicide statutes makes no 
mention about consideration of an individual’s ethnic or racial identity. 
 89. Sometimes, students will include these factors in their case briefs, but usually only for 
the purpose of emphasizing their lack of significance in the court’s study of the case. 
 90. I address this in a different way in my upper-class courses by inviting my students to 
submit “found poetry” in exchange for extra credit points.  This optional assignment encourages 
students to read solely for the purpose of experiencing the power and beauty of the written word.  
For this wonderful and rewarding exercise idea, I am indebted to Professor Leonora Goodwin.  
For more information on found poetry, see THE TEACHERS & WRITERS HANDBOOK OF POETIC 
FORMS (Ron Padgett ed., 1987). 
 91. Of course, many others do.  See,  e.g., sources cited supra note 9. 
 92. I suspect that, earlier in the semester, students are more likely to be able to identify the 
process of legal education, or at least the impact of the process, on their constructions of the 
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only to stand and point at the tip of the iceberg.  I do this because, as has been 
aptly stated elsewhere, “the spirit of education demands a more honest 
disclosure to students about both what they are learning and also the means of 
teaching employed.”93 
Even if teachers choose to forgo in-class discussion of the process of legal 
education, being mindful of how the law school classroom operates may lead 
more criminal law instructors to include coverage of cultural defenses on their 
syllabi.  Teaching cultural defenses opens our students’ eyes to alternative and 
new arguments to be raised in the criminal law context.  It also sheds light on 
the dominant culture that reigns over the creation, construction, and 
enforcement of our criminal laws.  Finally, it offers the opportunity to provide 
students with a framework in which to contemplate their legal education and 
the legal process. 
Here is a final appeal for incorporating Issue Three into class discussion—
although deconstructing the law school classroom may seem to run counter to 
the goal of teaching first-year students to “think like lawyers,” a glimpse of the 
process, for both students and professors, may help somewhat to demystify the 
first-year experience by providing students with a context for legal education.  
A caveat, however, is necessary: Raising this in the classroom may have an 
effect similar to that achieved by Toto, Dorothy’s little dog in the 1939 film 
The Wizard of Oz, when he pulled back a curtain and revealed that the great 
and powerful Wizard of Oz was merely a screen-projected image created by a 
hapless side-show magician.  Revealing the “man behind the curtain” was 
disappointing and disillusioning for Dorothy and her entourage.  Likewise, a 
frank conversation about what truly goes on in the classroom may diminish the 
qualities of awe and wonder surrounding the rite of passage first-year students 
undergo.  Nevertheless, providing this kind of insight achieves the worthy goal 
of helping beginning law students “learn how to put the law school classroom 
in its place within the larger context of the communities in which they live.”94  
In the same vein, unmasking the would-be wizard was enlightening for the 
party of four and constituted a positive step toward helping Dorothy find her 
way home. 
 
cases.  By the time that we have diligently worked through the elements of a crime, however, 
most students have become reasonably proficient in the cadence of the law school classroom and 
have learned to focus only on facts deemed relevant by the court. 
 93. Hirsch, supra note 4, at 122. 
 94. Id. at 128. 
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